Delays in Court Proceedings and Effective Remedies

What Constitutes Delays in Court Proceedings?

Delays in court proceedings can be characterized as situations where a court hearing a case fails to act when it should. This means it remains inactive or does not act with sufficient speed and efficiency, thereby unnecessarily prolonging the dispute. Such delays may result not only from the court’s inactivity but also from its lack of focus or ineffective conduct of the proceedings. The occurrence of these delays leads to a violation of the right to a fair trial, which is guaranteed by:

1. Article 48(2) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic (“the Constitution”); and
2. Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”).

It should be noted at the outset that Article 6(1) is the most frequently violated provision of the Convention.

What Impact Do Delays in Proceedings Have on the Right to a Fair Trial?

The essence of the right to a fair trial lies in the principle that everyone has the right to have their case heard fairly, publicly, and within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court established by law, which will decide on their civil rights and obligations. As can be seen, the right to a fair trial encompasses several individual components, such as the independence and impartiality of courts and judges, the principle of a lawful judge, the principle of equality, the principle of publicity, and others.

The right to a fair trial also includes the right to have one’s case heard without undue delay. The purpose of this fundamental right is to ensure that a person asserting their right can achieve a situation in which the competent authority, both in terms of subject matter and jurisdiction, decides on the asserted right within a reasonably short period of time necessary to conduct the proceedings.

Delays in proceedings are also addressed by the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic (“the Constitutional Court”), which has defined the purpose of the right to proceedings without undue delay as follows: The purpose of the right to have a case heard without undue delay is to eliminate the state of legal uncertainty in which a person seeking a decision from a public authority finds themselves. Mere consideration of the case by a public authority does not remove this uncertainty. Legal certainty is achieved only through a final and binding decision. Therefore, to fulfill the constitutional right under Article 48(2) of the , it is not sufficient for the public authority merely to consider the case. The constitutional right to have a case heard without undue delay is fulfilled only when a final and binding decision of the public authority is issued, thereby removing the person’s legal uncertainty regarding their rights.

The Constitutional Court further stated that “the fundamental duty of the court is to ensure such procedural conduct in judicial proceedings that will eliminate the state of legal uncertainty, the very reason why a person turned to the court for a decision as quickly as possible.” This principle is fundamental for the application of the basic right to have a case heard without undue delay. At first glance, it might appear that a court can cause delays in proceedings only by remaining inactive. However, a court may also cause delays even when it acts if it fails to act effectively, leading to a prompt decision in the matter.

Criterias determining the reasonableness of the length of proceedings:

Four (4) basic criteria are used to assess whether the duration of the proceedings is reasonable:

1. complexity of the case – the main criteria considered when assessing whether a case is complex include the factual circumstances of the case as well as the applicable legal framework relevant to the matter being adjudicated. (e.g. proposing a large number of pieces of evidence or the need to hear testimony from many witnesses);
2. the applicant’s conduct – represents an objective element of the proceedings over which the state has no control (e.g. failure to appear at hearings, frequent changes of legal representatives);
3. the conduct of the relevant authorities – refers to how the competent authorities approach the case, requiring that decision-making bodies act with due diligence and handle the matter promptly (delays may be caused, e.g., by repeated changes of judges or failure to schedule hearings);
4. the importance of the case for the applicant – this criterion depends on the nature of the case, where quicker proceedings are expected (e.g. cases concerning the return of children to their country of origin, or cases involving detained defendants). Case law of the European Court of Human Rights on delays in proceedings:

The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”), in its case law, confirms the frequent violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention, which guarantees the right to a fair trial. From the ECHR’s decisions, the following cases may be mentioned, for example:

• Judgment X v. France, judgment of March 31, 1992 – The case concerned the applicant, Mr. X, who died in 1992 after several hospital stays. Mr. X was a hemophiliac who had undergone several blood transfusions, particularly between September 1984 and January 1985. On June 21, 1985, he was diagnosed as HIV positive. Consequently, Mr. X decided to submit a claim for compensation to an administrative authority, alleging that he had contracted HIV as a result of the Minister of Health’s negligent delay in introducing appropriate regulations governing the supply of blood products. A total of 649 other similar claims were also submitted to the Minister of Health, as Mr. X was not the only infected person. As Mr. X’s health condition deteriorated, he brought an action before the administrative court, stressing the immediacy of the serious risk he faced . Mr. X complained that it took the administrative court an average of two years to issue a judgment, although the review of his case did not suffer from any unusual delays, and the court had all the necessary documentation to issue a decision. The ECHR held that, in the present case, the crucial issue for the applicant was to obtain a decision as quickly as possible due to his incurable illness and shortened life expectancy. The Court stated that the case required particular diligence, yet the administrative court had not used its powers to expedite the proceedings. The administrative court was obliged to conduct an investigation into the State’s liability as soon as the case was referred to it. Therefore, the ECHR concluded that the reasonable time requirement had been exceeded and found a violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention.
• Judgment Matoń v. Poland, judgment of June 9, 2009 – In this case, the applicant was charged with drug trafficking, unlawful possession of firearms, and membership in an organized criminal group. The case involved 36 defendants and 147 witnesses. The applicant was charged in 2000 and convicted in 2008. He appealed to the regional court, which, at the time the case was being examined by the ECHR, had not yet ruled on his appeal. The applicant also lodged a complaint with the appellate court, alleging a violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time, but the court dismissed his complaint. The ECHR accepted that the case was very complex, involving numerous defendants and a large volume of evidence. However, the Court emphasized that this circumstance alone could not justify the overall length of the criminal proceedings. Even taking into account the difficulties faced by the national authorities, they were still obliged to organize the proceedings efficiently and to uphold the guarantees of the Convention. Since the criminal proceedings lasted more than eight years, the ECHR found that the requirement of a reasonable time had not been respected, and therefore held that there had been a violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention.
• Judgment Voleský v. the Czech Republic, judgment of June 29, 2004 – The case concerned the applicant, who married in 1990 and had a son. In April 1994, his wife left him and took their son with her, while the applicant unsuccessfully tried to persuade her to return. Subsequently, conflicts arose between the spouses. In June 1994, the applicant’s wife filed a petition for the regulation of parental rights and duties after requesting a divorce. At that time, under the amended legal framework, divorce proceedings were suspended until a decision was issued regarding custody and parental arrangements. The proceedings ultimately lasted until 2002, spanning four judicial levels and taking 8 years and 5 months in total. The applicant complained about the excessive length of the custody proceedings, arguing that, given the nature and importance of the case, the authorities should have shown special diligence. He claimed that none of the courts had taken effective measures or shown sufficient effort to prevent undue delays. The delays were primarily caused by the repeated transfer of files between different courts. The government, on the other hand, argued that while the case was not complex at the beginning, it became increasingly complicated over time, particularly due to the strained relationship between the parents and issues related to interim measures. The government also contended that the applicant’s own conduct contributed to the delays, as he had failed to comply with the interim measure issued on July 17, 1995. The ECHR held that the length of the proceedings was excessive in light of the importance of the matter for the applicant and the need for expeditious handling of family cases. Consequently, the Court found a violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention.

The Constitutional Court consistently states that the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), when providing protection of the right to have one’s case heard within a reasonable time guaranteed by Article 6(1) of the Convention, whose substantive components are essentially identical to those of the fundamental right under Article 48(2) of the Constitution, also applies the criterion of the importance of the case from the applicant’s perspective. In this regard, the ECHR differentiates the assessment of the reasonableness and smoothness of proceedings into four (4) categories:

1. proceedings requiring appropriate promptness;
2. proceedings requiring special promptness (e.g., labor disputes or cases concerning activities that serve as the applicant’s source of livelihood , disputes related to personal status, etc.),
3. proceedings requiring exceptional promptness (e.g. cases concerning parental contact with children, deprivation of parental rights, compensation for persons suffering from hemophilia or HIV-infected persons as a result of medical treatment , etc.)
4. Proceedings requiring so-called special urgency (in cases where the accused is in custody – here, the speed of proceedings is assessed not under Article 6(1) of the Convention, but under Article 5(3); however, if the accused is released during the proceedings, only the remaining part of the case is assessed under Article 6(1) of the Convention ).

Is it possible to effectively defend against delays in proceedings?

In principle, it is possible to file a complaint against the inactivity of a court pursuant to Act No. 757/2004 Coll. on Courts and on Amendments and Supplements to Certain Acts (the “Act on Courts”).

The Act on Courts, in Section 62(1), stipulates that: A complaint may be filed by a party to the proceedings. The complaint concerning the conduct of the court may be directed against a violation of the right to a public hearing of the case without undue delay, or against a violation of the principles of dignity of judicial proceedings by judges, judicial officers, or court employees performing tasks related to the administration of justice. A complaint about the inactivity of a court must, under the Act on Courts, be submitted in written form. The Act further stipulates that such a complaint must be handled within 30 days from the date of its delivery. However, if this period is extended, the complaint must be resolved no later than three months from the date of its delivery.

It is important to note that filing a complaint about the inactivity of a court is generally the first prerequisite for exercising the constitutional right to have a case heard without undue delay before the Constitutional Court. However, the Constitutional Court, in its practice, often waives the requirement to file a complaint about court inactivity before submitting a constitutional complaint. The circumstance justifying such a waiver is typically the length of the ongoing proceedings.

When applying the strict doctrine requiring the submission of a complaint about court inactivity to the President of the Court, the Constitutional Court relies primarily on the conclusions contained in its Resolution No. I. ÚS 49/98: “In proceedings before the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, where the applicant alleges a violation of the fundamental right to judicial protection (or other legal protection) as well as the right to a fair trial because a general court failed to act in accordance with the law, it is essential that all available legal remedies accessible to the applicant be exhausted first — not just some of them — before turning to the Constitutional Court with a request for the protection of the alleged fundamental right.” According to Drgonec, the current case law of the Constitutional Court holds that the right to file a constitutional complaint for proceedings involving undue delays arises only for a person who has first filed a complaint about court inactivity (addressed to the President of the Court) before submitting the constitutional complaint).

According to Drgonec, a complaint about court inactivity thus represents a legal remedy without any direct legal effect on the availability of the right to have a case heard without undue delay – It is legally irrelevant whether the court handling the complaint acknowledges its justification or does not deal with it at all; however, according to Drgonec, the authorized person must file the complaint if they wish to avoid having their submission to the Constitutional Court rejected. In this respect, we can observe a postponement of the accessibility of the right to have a case heard without undue delay.

Despite the above, it can be stated that there are also opposing decisions in which the Constitutional Court itself, referring to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), has held that a complaint about delays in proceedings addressed to the president of the court is not considered an effective remedy for the rights alleged to have been violated by the complainant. We can therefore conclude that the case law in this area is not yet settled, but it is reasonable to agree that if the complainant raises the issue of delays in the proceedings by filing a complaint about the inactivity of the court, the chances of success before the Constitutional Court will be significantly higher — in such a case, the Constitutional Court is unlikely to dismiss the constitutional complaint as inadmissible. Only if the complainants have exhausted all available legal remedies for the judicial or other legal protection of their fundamental rights or freedoms, and those remedies have proven ineffective, may they seek protection of their fundamental rights or freedoms through a constitutional complaint.

In favor of the unnecessary exhaustion of complaints of inaction addressed to the president of the court, it is possible to argue Article 13 of the Convention, which enshrines the right to an effective remedy before a domestic authority. In connection with Article 35 of the Convention, it is necessary to note that the ECtHR only accepts as admissible complaints that have been preceded by the exhaustion of domestic remedies. The ECtHR considers an effective remedy to be one that is available and enables redress or satisfaction for the alleged violation of the Convention. As Drgonec states, a complaint about delays in proceedings addressed to the president of the court cannot therefore be interpreted, even from the perspective of the legal system of the Slovak Republic, as an effective remedy which under all circumstances prevents the violation of the fundamental right to unnecessary delays in proceedings or prevents its continuation. In his opinion, however, it must still be filed. As already mentioned above, the case law of the Constitutional Court in recent years tends to support the view that a complaint addressed to the president of the court under Section 62 et seq. of the Courts Act cannot be considered an effective legal remedy for a violation of the right guaranteed by Article 6(1) of the Convention, referring to the case law of the ECtHR, according to which it is the fundamental duty of the court to decide on the claim within a reasonable time, even without reminders, comments, requests, complaints, and constitutional complaints. On the other hand, failure to lodge a complaint of inaction with the president of the court may be taken into account when considering the amount of financial compensation.

The result is a very peculiar situation in practice – in accordance with the Convention and the case law of the ECtHR, it can be concluded that filing a complaint of inaction by the court is not an effective remedy, but on the other hand, it is not possible to file a constitutional complaint. an effective remedy, but on the other hand, it is not possible to lodge a constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Court without first filing a complaint against inaction. It can therefore be concluded that the Constitutional Court makes the use of an effective remedy (constitutional complaint) conditional on the use of an ineffective remedy (complaint against the inaction of the court addressed to the president of the court), although it has recently been gradually abandoning this condition in its decision-making. For this reason, we therefore lean towards the Constitutional Court’s interpretation that this is an ineffective remedy, as when filing a complaint against the inaction of the court, one may encounter a situation where the court may not consider it justified. However, in order to increase the chances of success when filing a complaint with the Constitutional Court, it is advisable to first file a complaint about delays addressed to the president of the court.

In conclusion, it can be stated that the ECtHR stated in relation to the Slovak Republic: “The Court considers it useful to recall that when examining a complaint about the length of proceedings, the president of the court concerned acts more in a managerial capacity than in a judicial capacity. On this point, the Court further notes that , in order for a remedy to be considered “effective” for the purposes of the Convention, it must enable the alleged violation to be prevented or its continuation to be stopped, or provide adequate redress for any violation that has occurred. While preventive measures are preferable in relation to lengthy proceedings, once a violation of the length of proceedings has occurred, a remedy that merely speeds up the proceedings may not be sufficient and compensation or another form of redress may be required.

Statistics clearly show that Article 6(1) of the Convention and Article 48(2) of the Constitution are the most frequently violated articles, which in the Slovak Republic are reviewed in the context of judicial review when claiming the right to a fair trial. Given that delays in court proceedings are indeed common, we recommend the following course of action in this regard:

1. actively monitor the status of proceedings in court;
2. if you have doubts that the court is not acting, request information about the status of the proceedings in writing;
3. use the option of filing a complaint about delays in proceedings with the president of the court, and subsequently, if this remedy is not effective;
4. file a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court.

As opinions on filing complaints about delays in proceedings are currently not settled, we recommend filing a complaint in order to increase the chances that the constitutional complaint will not be rejected on the grounds that all remedies have not been exhausted. However, if the Constitutional Court does not find a violation of the right to a fair trial (to the detriment of the complainant), the last option to consider is filing a complaint with the ECtHR.

References

1. Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic of August 26, 2021, ref. no. III. ÚS 359/2021.
2. The HUDOC database lists almost 21,500 cases of violations.
3. Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
4. For more details, see Števček, M. et al. Civil Procedure Law. Introduction to Civil Procedure and Litigation. Prague: C. H. Beck, 2022, p. 106.
5. Drgonec, J. Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Theory and Practice. 2nd revised and expanded edition. Bratislava: C. H. Beck, 2019, p. 958.
6. Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic of October 25, 1995, ref. no. II. ÚS 26/95.
7. Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic of November 30, 2021, ref. no. I. ÚS 318/2021.
8. See Drgonec, J. Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Theory and Practice. 2nd revised and supplemented edition. Bratislava: C. H. Beck, 2019, p. 958.
9. See Drgonec, J. Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Theory and Practice. 2nd revised and expanded edition. Bratislava: C. H. Beck, 2019, p. 956.
10. For example, the ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic of November 30, 2021, ref. no. I. ÚS 318/2021.
11. Judgment in Poláčik v. Slovak Republic. Judgment of November 15, 2005, on complaint no. 58707/00.
12. Judgment in X. v. France. Judgment of 31 March 1992 on complaint No. 18020/91.
13. Vojtuš, F., Kurilovská L., and Kordík M. Speed of criminal proceedings, significance, evaluation, and assessment criteria. Available online: <https://www.akademiapz.sk/sites/default/files/PTP/4-2021/004%20%20VOJTUŠ%2C%20KURILOVSKÁ%2C%20KORDÍK%20%20Speed%20of%20criminal%20proceedings%2C%20significance%2C%20evaluation%20and%20assessment%20criteria_EDITED.pdf>.
14. Drgonec, J. Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Theory and Practice. 2nd revised and expanded edition. Bratislava: C. H. Beck, 2019, p. 967.
15. Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic of October 25, 1995, ref. no. II. ÚS 26/95, Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic of November 30, 2021, ref. no. I. ÚS 318/2021.
16. Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic of July 8, 1998, ref. no. I. ÚS 49/98.
17. Drgonec, J. Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Theory and Practice. 2nd revised and supplemented edition. Bratislava: C. H. Beck, 2019, p. 967.
18. See Drgonec, J. Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Theory and Practice. 2nd revised and supplemented edition. Bratislava: C. H. Beck, 2019, p. 968.
19. Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic of November 30, 2021, ref. no. I. ÚS 318/2021
20. See Macejková, I. et al. Act on the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic. Commentary. 1st edition. Bratislava: C. H. Beck, 2020, p. 1008.
21. See Drgonec, J. Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Theory and Practice. 2nd revised and supplemented edition. Bratislava: C. H. Beck, 2019, p. 969.
22. Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic of March 10, 2022, ref. no. III. ÚS 6/2022.
23. E.g. Judgment of Ištván and Ištvánová v. Slovak Republic. Judgment of 12 June 2012 on complaint no. 30189/07.
24. Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic of November 30, 2021, ref. no. III. ÚS 494/2021.
25. Judgment of Ištván and Ištvánová v. Slovak Republic. Judgment of 12 June 2012 on complaint No. 30189/07.